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Abstract: Manifestationalism holds that science aims only to give us theories 
that are correct about what has been observed thus far. Several philosophers, 
including Bas van Fraassen, have argued that manifestationalism cannot make 
sense of the scientific impetus to make new observations, since such 
observations only risk turning manifestationally adequate theories into 
inadequate ones. This paper argues that a strikingly similar objection applies 
to van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, the view that science aims 
only to find theories that are empirically adequate. Roughly, the objection is 
that constructive empiricism cannot make sense of the scientific impetus to 
expand the limits of what can be observed, since such expansions only risk 
turning empirically adequate theories into inadequate ones. 
 
1. Introduction 
Any empiricism worthy of its name makes a distinction between the empirical and 
the non-empirical, prioritizing the former over the latter. Different forms of 
empiricism draw the line in different ways. Logical empiricists made a linguistic 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms, for instance, while Bas van 
Fraassen (1980) makes a distinction between observable and unobservable parts of the 
world, e.g. entities or processes. Whether a part of the world counts as observable 
depends, for van Fraassen, on whether the relevant scientific community would be 
able to observe it directly in the right circumstances. This relativizes observability to 
a given community: Something may count as observable relative to a community with 
greater observational powers while counting as unobservable relative to a community 
that is more observationally limited. To say that something is observable is, for van 
Fraassen, simply to say that it is observable relative to our community. 
One consequence of this relativity in what counts as observable is that the line 
between observable and unobservable would shift if there are sufficiently substantial 
changes to the observational powers of the relevant community. An entity that was 
previously unobservable could become observable, not because of any real changes in 
the entity itself but because the relevant community has increased its abilities to 
observe entities of this kind.1 In this paper, I argue that this malleability in what counts 
as observable according to van Fraassen creates a problem for van Fraassen‘s 
constructive empiricism, which holds that scientific theories are successful in so far as 
they are correct about the observable aspects of the world. Roughly, the problem is 
that constructive empiricism seems to imply that scientists who augment their 
observational powers are risking that a previously successful theory might thereby 
become unsuccessful. Since scientists themselves do not seem to recognize this as a 
genuine risk – scientists do not hesitate to augment their observational powers 
whenever possible – there seems to be tension between constructive empiricism and 
established scientific practice. 
In what follows, I formulate what I consider to be the most plausible version of 
this argument, and consider some ways in which a Constructive Empiricist might 
respond. At the end of the day, I am not sure whether this argument constitutes a 
genuine problem for constructive empiricism, but as far as I can tell there is no obvious 
or easy response available on constructive empiricism‘s behalf. Constructive 
empiricism has been heavily criticized on numerous occasions, but I believe that many 
– perhaps most – of the objections that have so far been made against constructive 
empiricism are based on misconceptions of what constructive empiricism is and 
entails.2 I am confident that the argument I consider here, whatever its merits in other 
respects, is not of this kind.  
 
2. Constructive Empiricism and Observability 
 
1 Of course, the entity would „change“ in the sense that it would go from having the property of being 
observable to a community to lacking that same property. But this is paradigmatic example of a mere 
„Cambridge change“ (cf. Geach 1969); hence the qualified expression „real change“ in the main text. 
2 For example, constructive empiricism is often criticized for arbitrarily limiting what we can know to 
things that happen to be observable (Alspector-Kelly 2001); but in fact constructive empiricism entails 
nothing about what can and cannot be known (Monton and van Fraassen 2003). Another example: 
Some authors criticize van Fraassen for rejecting inferences to the best explanation to the truth of 
theories while accepting inferences to the best explanation to the conclusion that theories are 
empirically adequate (e.g. Psillos 1996); but in fact van Fraassen rejects both kinds of inferences – 
because he rejects the entire rule or schema called “Inference to the Best Explanation” (Ladyman et al. 
1997). 
Van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image (1980)3 did not just argue for a new kind of scientific 
anti-realism, constructive empiricism, but also proposed an influential way of 
understanding what the scientific realism debate is really about. According to van 
Fraasen, there are two points of contention between scientific realists and anti-realists. 
The first concerns the aim of science: Scientific realists hold that the aim of science is 
to give us true theories, while anti-realists hold that the aim of science is something 
other than truth. The second point of contention concerns what is to accept a scientific 
theory: Scientific realists hold that accepting a theory involves believing that the 
theory is true; anti-realists hold that one can accept a theory without believing that it 
is true. In this paper, I will set aside the issue of the nature of scientific acceptance (in 
part because I have discussed it elsewhere; see Dellsén 2017), and instead focus on the 
former, i.e. the debate about the aim of science. 
Van Fraassen’s use of the term ‘the aim of science’ should not be taken too 
literally. Science is not the sort of being that could literally be aiming for anything in 
the sense that, for instance, an archer aims their bow at a target. Nor is van Fraassen 
referring to the personal aims or goals of individual scientists, or of the majority of 
scientists at a given time. Rather, van Fraassen uses the term ‘aim’ simply to refer to 
the basic criterion of success of the scientific enterprise – an enterprise whose 
participants might have various different personal goals and motives. The aim of 
science – or of a particular science – is thus to be understood as the basic criterion of 
success in (the) science. So, realism and anti-realism are in part different views about 
the basic criterion of success in science: Realism holds that science is genuinely 
successful only if (or in so far as) its theories are true, while anti-realism holds that 
science need not give us any true theories in order to be genuinely successful. 
By definition, anti-realism is the negation of realism. So, with regard to the aim 
of science, anti-realism is merely the negative thesis that the aim of science isn’t truth. 
Sooner or later, however, any anti-realist will have to provide a positive account of 
what the aim of science is. Constructive empiricism is van Fraassen’s attempt to 
provide such an answer in the tradition of empiricists like Locke, Hume, Carnap and 
Hempel. According to constructive empiricism, “[s]cience aims to give us theories 
which are empirically adequate” (van Fraassen 1980: 12). In other words, the basic 
criterion of success in science is empirical adequacy, rather than truth. But what is 
“empirical adequacy”? We don’t need to bother here with the precise definition; 
 
3 Although see also van Fraassen 1985, 1989, 2001, 2007. 
suffice it to say that a theory is empirically adequate roughly when what the theory 
says about observable parts of the world is true. 
Now, since empirical adequacy is thus defined in terms of what is observable, a 
lot hangs on how we understand this term within van Fraassen’s account. As a “rough 
guide to the avoidance of fallacies”, van Fraassen suggests that “X is observable if 
there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present to us under those 
circumstances, then we observe it” (1980: 16). In fact, this “rough guide” is not just 
rough but also incomplete in van Fraassen’s view, because it leaves the term “observe” 
undefined. According to van Fraassen, however, this is as it should be since precisely 
what is involved in observation is a question to be answered by empirical science 
rather than philosophical analysis or stipulation (van Fraassen and Muller 2008; see 
also Musgrave 1985, Dicken and Lipton 2006, Dicken 2009).  
Let me highlight three features of van Fraassen’s understanding of 
observability that are relevant to the present discussion. First, as I mentioned 
previously, observability is relative to one’s epistemic community. Something that 
isn’t observable to one community might be observable to another, depending on the 
observational powers of those in each community. So – to take an extreme and 
perhaps overworked example – if there are Martians who can observe certain entities 
that we cannot observe, then those entities will be observable for the Martians but not 
for us (cf. Churchland 1985). 
Second, van Fraassen notes that “‘observable’ is a vague predicate” (1980: 16). So 
while there will be things that are clearly observable (e.g., tables and chairs), and 
things that are clearly unobservable (e.g., the exact curvature of spacetime at a given 
location), there will also be things in between that aren’t clearly either observable or 
unobservable. So unless one adopts a Williamson-style epistemicism about vagueness 
(Williamson 1992), it will be indeterminate whether certain things are observable or 
unobservable. 
Finally, I wish to highlight that constructive empiricism doesn’t need to draw 
the line between what’s observable and what’s not in any particular place (cf. van 
Fraassen 2001: 163; 2008: 110). All that’s really required is that there be such a line to 
be drawn somewhere such that the line can plausible be considered to demarcate the 
‘empirical’ from the ‘non-empirical’. Thus, for example, a Constructive Empiricist 
could (without contradicting herself) hold that entities that can only be detected using 
microscopes are observable provided the microscopes are widely available and 
reliable. In this sense, the distinction between observable and unobservable can be 
thought of as a ‘free parameter’ within constructive empiricism. 
 
3. The Manifestationalist Challenge 
With these points in place, let us turn now to a potential problem for constructive 
empiricism that I will call the manifestationalist challenge. This challenge arises as one 
starts to think about the motivations one might have for adopting constructive 
empiricism rather than scientific realism. Recall that while scientific realism says that 
science isn‘t successful until it has given us true theories, constructive empiricism says 
that success in science requires only empirical adequacy, i.e. roughly truth with regard 
to observable aspects of the world. Since empirical adequacy is weaker than truth (i.e., 
all true theories are empirically adequate, but not vice versa), constructive empiricism 
apparently attributes a more modest epistemic aim to science than does scientific 
realism. According to van Fraassen himself (see Monton and van Fraassen 2003, 
quoted below) this is one of the main motivations for constructive empiricism as 
contrasted with scientific realism: We should not attribute to science a more ambitious 
epistemic aim if a more modest aim will do just as well. 
But as Peter Railton (1990) points out, this apparent benefit of constructive 
empiricism quickly turns into a problem. For if epistemic modesty is what is at issue, 
then it seems that an even more modest anti-realist alternative to scientific realism 
should be preferable to constructive empiricism, viz. what Railton (1990: 234-5) calls 
manifestationalism. Manifestationalism holds that science aims to give us theories that 
are correct in all of what they say about phenomena that have actually been observed. 
(We might describe such theories as “manifestationally adequate”.) 
Manifestationalism could be understood as a kind of actualistic empiricism, since it 
essentially holds that the aim of science is restricted to having correct theories about 
what is observed in the actual world. By contrast, constructive empiricism holds that 
science also aims to give us correct theories about phenomena that haven‘t been and 
won‘t be observed – but could be. 
The option of adopting manifestationalism about the aim of science seems to 
suggest that constructive empiricism is unstable with regards to the motivation of 
epistemic modesty. The argument would go as follows: In so far as we are choosing 
between constructive empiricism and scientific realism with reference to epistemic 
modesty, it seems that we should go further and accept manifestationalism rather than 
constructive empiricism. After all, manifestationalism is even more modest than 
constructive empiricism. If, however, we reject the idea of using epistemic modesty as 
a criterion in the debate, then it seems that we might as well be scientific realists. Either 
way, the fact that constructive empiricism attributes a more modest aim to science 
would give us no reason to be constructive empiricists rather than scientific realists. 
In nutshell, the challenge here is to motivate constructive empiricism without ‘proving 
too much’ and end up motivating a more extreme form of anti-realism, viz. Railton’s 
manifestationalism. 
In an influential article, Gideon Rosen (1994) has suggested a way to meet this 
challenge. The idea is to show that manifestationalism makes the aim of science so 
modest that it can no longer explain why scientists ought to make observations that 
could otherwise be avoided. Rosen illustrates with an example: 
Consider, for example, an archeologist whose theory covers all the evidence so 
far collected about Etruscan urns. [The archeologist] has sole license to dig in 
the last uninspected patch of ground, but it is also in [the archeologist’s] power 
to destroy the site so that no one will ever have a chance to inspect it. What 
should [the archeologist] do?" (Rosen 1994: 162) 
Rosen’s question is a little unclear as it stands, because the archeologist might have all 
sorts of different kinds of reasons to dig or destroy the site. But presumably the issue 
is what the archaeologist should do in so far as she is trying to satisfy the aim of 
science, i.e. its criterion of success. What should the archeologist do qua scientist? 
Understood in this way, the answer to this question will depend on what one takes 
the aim of science to be.4 
For a manifestationalist, the answer is that the archeologist should destroy the 
site, because doing so guarantees that her theory will be manifestationally adequate, 
i.e. correct about all actually observed urns. After all, the archeologist’s theory is 
already correct concerning all urns that have been observed so far, and if there are no 
other urns to observe then her theory is guaranteed to be correct about all urns that 
have been and will be observed. Hence by destroying the site the archeologist 
guarantees that her theory will be successful according to manifestationalism. By 
 
4 Asay and Bordner (2015: 156-8) argue that manifestationalism has no bearing on what the 
archaeologist should do, mainly because (they claim) manifestationalism does not “entail anything 
about which sorts of scientific endeavors one should engage in” (Asay and Bordner 2015: 157). Maybe 
so, but it does entail something about which scientific endeavors promote the aim of science, i.e. make 
it more and less likely that our theories are successful according to science’s basic criterion of success. 
contrast, for a Constructive Empiricist, destroying the site does not in any way help 
make the theory satisfy science’s criterion of success, since the theory will have to 
answer to all observable entities whether or not they have actually been, or will ever 
be, observed. Rather, the archeologist should dig, because that way she can test her 
theory, possibly replace it, and thus increase the likelihood that the theory is 
empirically adequate. 
The point of Rosen’s example is of course to illustrate that manifestationalism 
implies – presumably incorrectly – that science’s criterion of success would be 
satisfied by destroying a potentially vital piece of evidence. By contrast, constructive 
empiricism can make perfectly good sense of why the scientist should dig rather than 
destroy the site. Rosen thus concludes that constructive empiricism can be thought of 
as “the most cautious position – the position most compatible with empiricism in the 
broad sense – which at the same time renders the phenomena of scientific activity fully 
intelligible and ratifiable” (1994: 162). The idea, then, is that we should take the aim of 
science to be as modest as is possible, but not so modest as to render it unable to 
account for what’s wrong with destroying the site in Rosen’s example. This position 
is echoed by van Fraassen himself in a paper co-authored with Bradley Monton: 
Consider a range of possibilities, with ‘science aims to give us true theories’ on 
the far right side, and ‘science aims to give us theories which are true in what 
they say about what is being observed right now’ on the far left side. Realists 
submit that attention to the practice of good science, where bold conjectures 
and audacious theorizing have been rewarded with much predictive success, 
moves us toward the right. Empiricists, who would wish for epistemic modesty 
in their paradigms of rational inquiry, would tend toward the left. Constructive 
empiricism finds an equilibrium point between the two extremes, thus 
respecting both desiderata (Monton and van Fraassen 2003: 407-8). 
So, to summarize, we have seen that constructive empiricism has been criticized as 
unstable in so far as it is motivated by a desire for epistemic modesty in our accounts 
of the aim of science. According to the objection, epistemic modesty should push us 
all the way to a more radically anti-realist position, manifestationalism. In response, 
Rosen argues (on van Fraassen’s behalf) that constructive empiricism is not unstable 
because if science aimed for anything less than empirical adequacy – as 
manifestationalism maintains – we couldn’t explain why it would be scientifically 
improper to destroy potentially vital pieces of evidence, such as the archeologist’s last 
digging site. In the remainder of this paper, I will suggest an argument analogous to 
Rosen’s argument against manifestationalism applies to constructive empiricism 
itself. The argument concerns what we may want to call ‘extended observability’, 
where the limits of what could be observed by an epistemic community are expanded 
or increased so that previously unobservable entities become observable. 
 
4. Extended Observability 
Let me start by distinguishing two ways in which observability can be extended 
according to constructive empiricism’s conception of observability: 
Epistemic immigration: The epistemic community expands to include beings that 
are observationally superior in some respect. 
Epistemic upgrading: Individual agents within an epistemic community increase 
their observational capacities. 
In both cases, the limits of observability have been extended in the sense that the 
resulting a community can observe entities that were previously unobservable. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse these two ways in which observability can 
be extended within a community. Epistemic immigration does not require any 
individual agents to increase their observational capacities; rather, the change in 
observability is due only to a change in who counts as members of the relevant 
community. By contrast, epistemic upgrading does not require that there be any 
changes in who counts as members of the community; rather, the change in 
observability is due only to changes in the members’ observational capacities. 
Although these two ways of extending observability have not been clearly 
distinguished to my knowledge, examples of both have been extensively discussed in 
the literature on scientific realism, anti-realism and empiricism. For instance, Paul 
Churchland’s thought experiment of microscope-fused humanoids is a good example 
of epistemic immigration:5 
[...] consider a race of hominoid creatures each of whom is born with an electron 
microscope permanently in place over his left `eye'. The scope is biologically 
constituted, let us suppose, and it projects its image onto a human-style retina, 
 
5 See also Kitcher’s (2001: 178) case of “Hawkeye”. 
with the rest of their neurophysiology paralleling our own (Churchland 1985: 
43-4). 
For Churchland, this thought experiment puts pressure on the distinction between 
observable and unobservable, because we can presumably imagine beings of this sort 
for any range of things that we cannot observe – making anything in principle 
susceptible to being observed by some beings that could enter into our community. 
In response to Churchland, van Fraassen rightly points out that Churchland’s 
argument is only a problem for those who seek a definition of ‘observable’ that isn’t 
relativized to an epistemic community. Once we relativize observability to a 
community, we can simply say that the limits of observability would change as the 
community changes: 
[...] suppose we have accepted these humanoids as persons, as members of our 
epistemic community. In that case we have already broadened the extension of 
us, and what is observable to them is observable (van Fraassen 1985: 256). 
Van Fraassen’s point here, I take it, is that the fact that the limits of observability can 
change doesn’t mean that there is no line to be drawn between observable and 
unobservable; it just means that the line needs to be drawn at a given time. That much 
seems correct. But notice that van Fraassen is here effectively acknowledging that 
epistemic immigration is possible according to his own understanding of what 
observability amounts to. 
So epistemic immigration is clearly possible on a van Fraassen-style 
understanding of observability, i.e. one that relativizes observability to an epistemic 
community. What about epistemic upgrading? Here I wish to make another 
distinction, which I borrow from Paul Humphreys (2004: 4ff), between two different 
kinds of epistemic upgrading. In observational extrapolation, one expands the range of 
observable values of a property whose values can already be observed within a 
limited range. For example, using our eyes and a ruler, we can measure the size of a 
given object with some particular precision – perhaps down to half a millimeter or so. 
Using an ordinary optical microscope, we can make the same size measurements but 
with considerably more precision – perhaps down to a micrometer at least (depending 
on which microscope we use, of course). If one observes the size of the object through 
the microscope, then this counts as a case in which one uses the microscope as a means 
to expand the range of observable values of the property size. We would thus have a 
case of observational extrapolation. 
In the other kind of epistemic upgrading discussed by Humphreys, 
observational augmentation, one manages to increase the number of properties whose 
values can be observed at all. Thus, in observational augmentation, one was 
previously unable to observe any values of a given property, and some of those values 
can now be observed. If there are any cases of observational augmentation, they 
would presumably involve observations of properties like electron spin, ionizing 
radiation, and magnetic fields – presumably by means of sophisticated measurement 
devices of various sorts. Of course, it will no doubt be controversial whether these are 
really cases of observational augmentation, since many empiricists are wont to reply 
that when scientists claim to ‘observe’ the spin of an electron, or an electromagnetic 
field, they are using ‘observe’ in a loose and imprecise way that should only be taken 
as a manner of speaking. What scientists genuinely observe is the readings on their 
measurement apparatuses, the numbers on their computer screens, and so forth. So, 
the argument goes, scientists don’t really augment their observational capacities; 
rather, they simply use their (unaugmented) observational capacities in a more 
efficient way, using instruments. 
This reply may appear plausible for observational augmentation, but it is much 
less plausible when applied to observational extrapolation. What we observe when 
we use a microscope, for example, doesn’t seem to be the image on the end of the 
microscope’s eyepiece; rather, it seems more plausible that we use the microscope to 
observe what is placed under it. This is even clearer when it comes to instruments that 
we use to enhance our senses on a daily basis, such as eyeglasses and hearing aids. 
According to the current objection, you would strictly speaking be observing the 
image displayed on the inside of your eyeglasses rather than the objects in front of 
you as soon as you put them on your nose. If a person with normal eyesight and no 
glasses is standing next to you, they would of course observe the objects rather than 
an image on your eyeglasses. So that person would, strictly speaking, be observing 
something entirely different from what you are observing. At this point, one will 
surely start to wonder whether a notion of ‘observation’ that works in this way could 
be the notion that is most relevant to an understanding of science. Scientists do make 
a distinction between empirical and non-empirical results/claims, but they do not 
distinguish between results obtained with and without the use of eyeglasses, hearing 
aids, or even microscopes. In so far as constructive empiricism is supposed to make 
sense of science as it is actually practiced, it thus seems more plausible to adopt a more 
flexible definition of ‘observable’ that allows for observational extrapolation and 
perhaps also observational augmentation. 
A further argument against a blanket ban on the idea of observing through 
instruments appeals to the idea that instruments could (and have already, to a large 
extent) become part of ‘us’ – or, more specifically, of our minds. According to the 
extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), our minds extend out to the world in 
certain cases to things to which we have a sufficiently reliable access, such as 
notebooks and smartphones. If so, our minds can also be said to extend to certain 
instruments that help us perceive and process things that were previously beyond our 
ken. Adam Toon (2014) explores this kind of issue in a recent paper, in which he 
argues that this possibility “provides the realist with a new argument against the 
constructive empiricist view of instruments” (2014: 410) and suggests that 
constructive empiricism should be replaced with an “empiricism for cyborgs” in 
which the limits of observability depend on what sort of instruments our minds 
extend to at a given time.6 
A third and final objection to the blanket ban on observation through 
instruments is that it seems unmotivated and arbitrary once we allow for the 
possibility of epistemic immigration, i.e. that the limits of observability could change 
due to observationally superior agents becoming part of our epistemic community. 
Having acknowledged that what counts as observable is relative to an epistemic 
community that might include, for example, humanoids with electron microscopes 
instead of eyes, what motivates the focus on specifically human physiology among 
the rest of us? If the microscope-fused humanoids count as observing what is under 
their microscopes, it seems that the rest of us (more or less normal humans) should 
also – on pain of drawing a completely arbitrary distinction – count as observing what 
is under our microscopes. 
Let us take stock. I have distinguished between two ways in which the limits 
of what is observable can be extended: In epistemic immigration, the relevant 
community is itself extended to include new, observationally superior beings. It seems 
undeniable that epistemic immigration is possible on a relativized notion of 
 
6 I think Toon is essentially correct here, although I must note that there is no such thing as “the 
constructive empiricist view of instruments”. Constructive empiricism is perfectly compatible with any 
view of instruments, even if its originator, van Fraassen, has particular views about the latter. So, in my 
view, Toon’s “empiricism for cyborgs” should be viewed as an extension of, rather than a competitor 
to, constructive empiricism. 
observability such as van Fraassen’s – and indeed we find that van Fraassen explicitly 
acknowledges this possibility. In addition to epistemic immigration, it seems plausible 
that the limits of observability could be extended through epistemic upgrading, i.e. a 
process whereby individual members of an epistemic community increase their 
observational capacities. There are two kinds of epistemic upgrading, observational 
extrapolation and observational augmentation, and while some empiricists might be 
inclined to reject the possibility of observational augmentation, it seems exceedingly 
implausible to say that observational extrapolation would be impossible. 
 
5. The Argument from Extended Observability 
For our present purposes, the most important upshot of the considerations adduced 
in the last section is that the limits of what counts as observable can be extended; 
moreover, it is at least partly in our own power whether or not we extend these limits, 
since it is at least partly in our power whether we allow for epistemic immigration, 
and perhaps it is also in our power whether we engage in epistemic upgrading 
(assuming epistemic upgrading is indeed possible). We are now finally in a position 
to set up the argument against constructive empiricism that I am interested in 
exploring. 
The basic idea behind the argument is that constructive empiricism implies that 
expanding the limits of observability carries a kind of risk for scientists that their 
already successful (because empirically adequate) theories will become unsuccessful 
(because empirically inadequate). It carries such a risk because once the limits of 
observability have expanded, all theories will be measured against a higher standard 
than before – viz. correctness with regard to not just all the previously observable 
entities but also with regard to the entities that have just become observable now that 
the limits of observability have expanded. This means that it is at least possible for 
some of the theories that were previously empirically adequate – given the previous 
limits for observability – to become empirically inadequate – given the new limits for 
observability. So constructive empiricism implies that expanding the limits of 
observability carries a risk of going against the aim of science, i.e. of impeding 
scientific success. Thus, all other things being equal, constructive empiricism implies 
that scientists have an important scientific reason not seek to expand the limits of 
observability. 
To illustrate, suppose that a given community of scientists were offered the 
choice of accepting into their community a number of beings who could perceive 
electromagnetic fields in much the same way that we see ordinary light. (This would 
be a case of epistemic immigration.) Or, to use a different kind of example, suppose a 
new instrument could be constructed through which magnetic fields could be 
detected with the same reliability and effortlessness with which most humans 
currently perceive ordinary light. (This would be a case of epistemic upgrading.) From 
the point of view of a scientific realist, there is no reason whatsoever not to allow this 
type of epistemic immigration or upgrading, since the only possible upshot is that we 
obtain another means to (reliably) measure electromagnetism, which in turn would 
increase our chances of obtaining true theories about electromagnetism and related 
phenomena. 
Things will look differently from constructive empiricism’s point of view. This 
new means of observing electromagnetism might help us get better – more empirically 
accurate – theories in various ways. But it will also elevate the standards against which 
any given theory is judged, and thereby make those standards harder to achieve. In 
particular, a theory of electromagnetism that had been empirically adequate before – 
because correct about all the entities that were observable at the time – could become 
empirically inadequate afterwards – because incorrect about some new set of entities 
that became observable by virtue of the epistemic immigration or upgrading would 
just have taken place. So constructive empiricism implies, in a way scientific realism 
does not, that epistemic immigration and upgrading involves risking that currently 
successful theories would become unsuccessful. 
It seems to me that this implication of constructive empiricism is problematic 
for two related reasons. First, if there was a risk for science to regress in this way 
through epistemic immigration and upgrading, we should expect scientists and 
scientific policy makers to be at least somewhat aware of this risk – if not explicitly in 
their pronouncements and stated aims, then at least implicitly through their planning 
and actions. However, I think it’s fair to say that there is no indication from scientific 
practice that scientists and scientific policy makers are in any way cautious or wary 
with regard to epistemic upgrading and immigration. If they were, we should expect 
a lot more energy and resources to be spent on researching where exactly the current 
boundaries of observability are located – exactly which entities are observable and 
which entities are not – and on coming up with plans for how to avoid transgressing 
those boundaries. The fact that we don’t see anything of this sort in scientific practice 
is thus a strike against constructive empiricism as an account of the aim of science. 
A second, but related, reason it is problematic for constructive empiricism to 
imply that epistemic immigration and upgrading involves risking that successful 
theories would become unsuccessful concerns its normative implications. An often-
overlooked fact about the scientific realism debate is that the various positions in this 
debate have important normative implications.7 For example, a scientific realist – who 
values truth beyond empirical adequacy – thinks that the work of a scientist is not 
finished once they have obtained empirically adequate theories of a given 
phenomenon; rather, the scientists must also choose which of a set of empirically 
adequate theories is also true. So while a scientist who follows constructive 
empiricism’s advice would move on to researching other phenomena as soon as they 
are convinced that empirical adequacy has been achieved, the realist-inclined scientist 
might rationally choose to spend their time and resources on finding the true theory 
of a phenomenon for which they have already achieved empirical adequacy. 
The point here is that whether scientists follow constructive empiricism or 
scientific realism will have real-life normative implications for how they conduct their 
research. Whether we, as philosophers, prefer constructive empiricism or scientific 
realism (or some other account of the aim of science) should thus depend – at least in 
part – on whether we agree with each account’s normative implications. The situation 
here is analogous to that in normative ethics, where we choose between ethical 
theories, e.g. utilitarianism and deontology, at least partly by appealing to the 
normative implications of each theory. For example, it is a prima facie objection to 
utilitarianism that it seems to recommend involuntary organ donations in which a 
single person is sacrificed to save the lives of five other people; similarly, it is a prima 
facie objection to Kantian deontology that it offers a blanket ban on lying, even to axe-
murderers who are searching for their next victims. 
What normative recommendation would constructive empiricism give a 
community of scientists who are faced with a choice of either (a) allowing or banning 
epistemic immigration, e.g. from creatures who are able to directly perceive 
electromagnetic fields, or (b) engaging in or abstaining from epistemic upgrading, e.g. 
by inventing and constructing a highly reliable and accessible instrument for 
perceiving electromagnetic fields? Of course, the answer will depend on exactly what 
 
7 For more on this general point, see Dellsén 2019. 
other foreseeable benefits and drawbacks there are to each course of action. But one 
important consideration for the constructive empiricist would be that extending the 
limits of observability in this way risks making empirically successful theories 
unsuccessful. So there will be circumstances – however contrived and convoluted – in 
which constructive empiricism implies that epistemic immigration and upgrading 
should be avoided or even banned (at least in so far as we are seeking scientific 
success). By contrast, scientific realism will have no such implications, since for the 
realist there is never any risk of changing which theories count as successful. After all, 
what counts as the truth is always and everywhere the same, regardless of what is 
observable within one’s epistemic community. 
Now, isn’t there something troubling, even absurd, in suggesting that 
epistemic immigration and upgrading could be something to be avoided? In both 
cases, we are simply extending the realm of entities that can be observed by us. How 
could that possibly be a bad thing? From an empiricist perspective, i.e. from the 
perspective of those who prioritize the empirical over the non-empirical aspects of 
science, epistemic immigration and upgrading give us a world in which a larger 
proportion of entities are located on the favored side of the empirical/non-empirical 
divide. Again, it is hard to see any reason to think this could ever be a bad thing. So 
the implication from constructive empiricism that it would (at least sometimes) be 
unadvisable for scientists to allow epistemic immigration or engage in epistemic 
upgrading appears to be an awkward normative implication, much like 
utilitarianism’s (apparent) implication regarding involuntary organ donation and 
Kantian deontology’s (apparent) implication regarding a blanket ban on lying. 
 
6. Two Empiricist Rejoinders (with Replies) 
How might a constructive empiricist, such as van Fraassen himself, respond to the 
argument of the previous section? Before concluding this paper, I will consider two 
possible responses that I think has a great deal of prima facie plausibility – even though 
I don’t think either is ultimately successful. According to the first response, any 
change to the limits of observability is, by constructive empiricism’s lights, a change 
in the criterion of success in science, and thus a change in the nature of science itself. 
As a result, comparing scientific success before and after a change in observability is 
effectively a comparison of success in different enterprises – an earlier science and a 
later science – for which there is no common standard of comparison. And since there 
is no common standard of comparison, any such comparison of scientific success 
before and after a change in observability is misguided. 
To develop this response a little further, consider van Fraassen’s analogy 
between science and chess. In explaining what he means by attributing an aim to 
science, van Fraassen notes that he means this in the same sense in which “[t]he aim 
of the game of chess is to checkmate your opponent” (van Fraassen 1980: 8). Now, 
suppose the rules concerning checkmate are changed so that what we currently refer to 
as a stalemate is henceforth considered as a kind of checkmate. Thus the ‘aim’ of the 
game of chess – its criterion of success – would now be different from what it was 
before, and chess players would have to adapt to the new rules, e.g. by making 
appropriate changes in their training and strategies. Now we can ask ourselves the 
following question: Would the game that is being played after the rule change be the 
same game as was being played before? Or would we rather be playing a different, 
albeit very similar, game afterwards? If we say that we are playing a different game 
after the rule change, then it seems that success and failure before and after the change 
cannot really be compared in a meaningful way. That would be to compare success 
and failure in one game with success and failure in another, e.g. like comparing 
success in tennis with success in badminton. Such across-game comparisons do not 
seem to make any sense. 
Similarly, a constructive empiricist might argue that if the limits of 
observability change from one time, t1, to another, t2, we in effect have two separate 
criteria for success at t1 and t2 according to CE. These can be roughly stated as follows: 
Empirical adequacy1: Being correct about what is observable for the relevant 
scientific community at t1. 
Empirical adequacy2: Being correct about what is observable for the relevant 
scientific community at t2. 
Now, since the basic criterion of success in an endeavor such as science is arguably 
constitutive of it, this would mean that we really have two distinct (but of course very 
similar) endeavors at t1 and t2. These two endeavors can be labelled science1 and 
science2. Of course, since science1 and science2 are so similar, one would be forgiven for 
confusing the two in most contexts (just as someone who confuses regular chess with 
stalemate-inclusive chess would surely be forgiven that in most contexts). 
Nevertheless, the two endeavors would be genuinely distinct, as evidenced by the fact 
that their constitutive criteria of success would be different. 
Now the point of all of this would be to show that, in case of epistemic 
immigration or upgrading, there wouldn‘t strictly speaking be a single endeavor, 
science, such that success and failure in that endeavor can be meaningfully compared 
at t1 and t2 respectively. Of course, we can still ask whether the endeavor we have is 
successful according to each of the criteria operative at t1 and t2 respectively, i.e. 
empirical adequacy1 and empirical adequacy2. But changing the limits of observability 
will not itself have any effect on whether our theories count as empirically adequate1, 
for example: If they were empirically adequate1 before the change, they will be 
empirically adequate1 afterwards as well (assuming all else remains equal in the 
process). And the same will be true, mutatis mutandis, for empirical adequacy2. But if 
it‘s misguided in this way to compare scientific success and failure before and after 
epistemic immigration or upgrading, i.e. success and failure in science1 and science2 
respectively, then the argument I presented in the previous section doesn‘t seem to 
get off the ground. 
So that‘s the empiricist rejoinder to the argument of the last section. I have said 
that I do not ultimately think it is successful. So what‘s my reply? Well, consider the 
issue from the point of view of scientists themselves. For scientists, what matters is to 
satisfy the criterion of scientific success, whatever it is, that is in play at for them at a 
given time. I does not matter to working scientists whether they are, strictly speaking, 
doing science1 or science2; what matters is only that they be successful at whatever 
enterprise they are engaged with. So, in their deliberation about what they should do 
in order to satisfy the criterion of success, scientists should take into account what the 
criterion will be in the near-to-distant future when their action takes place or bears 
fruit, as opposed to what the criterion is at the time of deliberation. And this holds 
even if the criterion at that point will be a criterion in a different endeavor, science2, 
since they will then have gone over from doing science1 to doing science2. 
To understand this point fully, it may be useful to go back to the chess analogy. 
A chess player who knows or strongly suspects that the rules of chess will change 
soon in the way we envisioned before (making a stalemate count as a kind of 
checkmate) should take that into account in her deliberation, e.g. in deciding how to 
prepare for her next tournament. It doesn’t matter to the chess player whether the 
game that is being played at the next tournament is, strictly speaking, a different game 
than what she is used to play (chess2 as opposed to chess1, if you will). The chess player 
simply wants to be successful relative to whatever criterion of success is in play at the 
time at which the game is played. Similarly, I am suggesting, a scientist will want to 
satisfy the criterion of success for the enterprise in which she is working – regardless 
of whether that criterion is empirical adequacy1 in science1 or empirical adequacy2 in 
science2. 
Accordingly, it seems to me that if it’s in scientists’ power to prevent the 
criterion of success in their discipline (whatever it is)8 from changing between t1 and 
t2 in a way that makes their own theories unsuccessful according to the criterion in 
play at t2, then they would be rational in doing so – at least in so far as they seek 
scientific success in the first place. And now we are back where we started: If 
constructive empiricism is correct that the criterion for success in science is empirical 
adequacy, then scientists who expand the limits of what can be observed risk making 
theories that were successful according to the previous criterion for success into 
scientifically unsuccessful theories according to the criterion in place after the 
expansion of the limits of observability. This holds even if criteria of success are 
constitutive of enterprises like science, because then these scientists can be described 
as changing the enterprise in which they are engaged from one in which their theories 
are successful – what I’ve been calling science1 – into one in which their theories are 
unsuccessful – science2. As before, however, it doesn’t seem as if there is any indication 
in scientific practice that scientists are concerned about ‘risks’ of this kind, nor does it 
seem to be a reasonable normative implication that it would sometimes be irrational 
for conscientious scientists to avoid or ban epistemic immigration and upgrading. 
A second empiricist rejoinder is to concede that the argument of the previous 
does undermine the empiricist position formulated by van Fraassen (1980) but insist 
that the argument can be avoided with a small modification. Specifically, the 
empiricist could insist that the aim of science is not just for one’s theories to be 
empirically adequate, but also to increase the range of observable entities. So, on this 
picture, science has two related aims: The first is to have theories that are correct about 
observables; the second is to increase the number of entities that count as observable. 
Given this additional aim of science, the constructive empiricist (of this modified 
variety) can explain why scientists ought to expand the limits of observable by 
 
8 The parenthesis here is meant to indicate that “criterion of success” is being used as non-rigid 
designator here to whatever is the criterion in the discipline that scientists happen to be engaged in. 
appealing to the fact that doing so makes additional things observable, thus satisfying 
the second aim of science.9 
The first thing to say about this rejoinder is that it is clearly somewhat ad hoc, 
in these of being a modification to a theory that is specifically designed to avoid a 
problem and isn’t independently motivated. Still, ad hoc theories can be true (as the 
history of science surely teaches us) so that by itself is not a knock-down argument 
against this rejoinder. A related point is that this conjunctive version of constructive 
empiricism would clearly be less simple than scientific realism, which posits only one 
aim for science, viz. that its theories be true). To this van Fraassen (or a van 
Fraassenite) could reply that he (she) places no epistemic weight on simplicity in 
scientific theory choice, so why should they be concerned with having a less simple 
account of science than the realist? So, again, I don’t think pointing to the complexity 
of this new empiricist account of the aim of science constitutes a knock-down 
argument either. 
But there is a more serious problem in the vicinity here. That problem emerges 
when we consider the issue from the point of view of a scientific realism. From the 
realist’s perspective, the second aim proposed by the current rejoinder is perfectly 
explicable as a means to obtaining true theories. Scientists should aim to expand the 
limits of observability, i.e. turn unobservable entities into observables ones, because 
science aims to discover the truth about all entities – not just the observables ones – 
and expanding the limits of observability enables us to confirm theories about 
previously-unobservable entities more strongly and more efficiently. The scientific 
realist can thus explain why the constructive empiricist must add the second aim in 
order to avoid the present problem. So, in a sense, adding this second aim to 
constructive empiricism is not ad hoc from the scientific realist’s perspective.  
It seems to me that this last point – that scientific realism can explain why an 
apparently ad hoc modification must be made to constructive empiricism, while 
constructive empiricism (in its original or modified variety) clearly cannot – is the 
most serious problem with the second empiricist rejoinder. In science and philosophy, 
one must sometimes learn to live with theories that are not as simple as one would 
like, or that have been modified ad hoc to avoid some problems; but it’s another thing 
 
9 Many thanks to Hedda Hassel Mørch and Andreas Brekke Carlsson for raising this concern. 
entirely to cling to a theory whose ad hoc modification is unmotivated by its own lights 
and yet perfectly explicable according to a rival theory. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that there is a tension in constructive empiricism‘s view of science, 
coupled with van Fraassen‘s relativized notion of observability. Specifically, I have 
argued that constructive empiricism implies that scientists have reason to prevent or 
discourage expanding the limits of what could be observed, because such an 
expansion risks making empirically adequate theories into empirically inadequate 
ones. This implication, I argued, is problematic – in part because there doesn‘t seem 
to be anything in scientific practice to suggest that scientists themselves take there to 
be any risk of this kind involved in expanding the limits of observability, and in part 
because this has the awkward normative implication that scientists should sometimes 
abstain from or even ban certain ways of expanding the current limits of observability. 
I am not going to seriously propose a solution to the problem, but I’ll end with 
a question that I think is worth thinking about. Might it be that this problem can be 
avoided by defining empirical adequacy not in terms of what is observable to the 
community at a time, as van Fraassen does, but rather in terms of what has been, is, or 
will be observable to the community – i.e. in terms of what is observable not at a 
specific time (now or in the past) but at any time whatsoever? I am not entirely sure this 
solves all the problems of the kind I’ve been concerned with, and it also might bring 
new problems that I haven’t thought of. But it might be a step in the right direction 
for those who, like me, are intrigued and impressed by the view of science we find in 
van Fraassen‘s constructive empiricism.10  
 
10 I am grateful for helpful feedback from participants at the Lauener Symposium at the University of 
Bern in September 2018 and my colleagues at Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences. I would 
like to especially thank Bas van Fraassen for inspiration and discussions in Bern. 
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